Yushchenko to transfer assets in the United States. Pinchuk merges Yatsenyuk. Yanukovych teaches English. We Tymoshenko – two campaign headquarters.

«ProUA» studied the work of headquarters and found that in elections with an eye to winning involves only Yanukovych and Tymoshenko. And then one of the candidates more waiting than working.

It turns out that Viktor Yushchenko has already figured in the summer of their future. That’s when the American vice-president Joe Biden brought the news that Obama, unlike the previous administration, it has not seen the president of Ukraine. After that Yushchenko would not only put paid to the revival of “Our Ukraine” to create a campaign headquarters. He began to pack suitcases in the literal sense of the word.

In late summer with the Zhitomir airport to send a few planes in Canada. According source closer to the Presidential Secretariat, there were two or three “side”, led by first lady uvezshih extensive collection of antiques collected by Viktor Andreyevich for many years.

Sources in the PR and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, Yushchenko enthusiastically watching all the time in his presidency, believe that the Canadian property through diplomatic channels exiting the U.S., home of Chicago-born Kateryna Yushchenko, Over recent years the areas of real estate in your own hometown. Note that according to financial disclosure president, members of his family in recent years spent on maintenance of assets abroad more stable than the Ukrainian real estate.

Prudence wife of the president means that Yushchenko could not agree on security guarantees with any of the main contenders for victory, as in his time managed to Kuchma and Yeltsin. Indirect confirmation of this can be found in the words of the president yet. September 24 before flying from the U.S.: “I will come back in six months.” Something similar, he said, when his BP fired him from the Cabinet in 2002. But then, Yushchenko promised that he would return by the President. Now, about his status, he kept silent …

Another kind of foresight shown Sponsors Arseniy Yatsenyuk. By mid-September, his staff had time to learn about $ 30 million, most of which came from Viktor Pinchuk and Leonid Yurusheva. At the same time, sociologists have documented overflow of the electorate from Yatsenyuk to Sergei Tigipko. Private study BYT, a recent structures Mykola Tomenko showed that Arseny lost in the rating of nearly two per cent and fell to 10%, whereas Tigipko went into stable 3,5%. And even before the massive release of television time.

It was the final argument for sponsors – they are billed, finally forcing the headquarters Yatsenuk refuse to work for the victory. Sept. 18 head of the Committee of Voters of Ukraine Oleksandr Chernenko at the press conference said that the headquarters of Arseniy hires members of precinct election commissions (PECs) at the rate of three people on board. And a week later in some areas who wish to get the job received from the ball.

Recall, each presidential candidate is entitled to two members to the PEC. This cost (usually it includes also the “buckwheat” to voters) – the largest staffs in the estimates of real candidates. For members of the PEC must protect the result of the candidate in the day and night vote. Their feedback indicates that Yatsenuk now rely only on an ad campaign whose ultimate goal now is to maintain a recognizable candidate in the calculation of future elections to the Rada.

Of course, a failing campaign Yatsenyuk (for sponsors actually paid for the drop in ranking) – this is not the only reason for “merging” of the candidate. In fact, the decision confirms the correctness of Staff Yatsenyuk sources “proUA”, even in July, spoke of the intention of Viktor Pinchuk withdraw its candidate into third place in the first round with a further “sell” rating to the most probable winner of the second round. At the time, this seemed Viktor Yanukovych. Now the oligarchs in this not so sure. Especially in anticipation of the final privatization of “Aerosvit”. In which is extremely interested Viktor Pinchuk.

Thus, the actual list of candidates down to two people. But the work staffs are radically different.

Rating superiority and adulation surrounding Mr. Yanukovich had turned his head so that he already sees himself as president and banal waits until the Dnieper not swim the corpse of his vragini.

And in order for the bank was not exactly boring, leader began to study English. Not just to forsonut in the United States, where he is going in the near future, and to easily communicate in the international market presidents.

Such confidence discouraged to impropriety. A striking example – blocking Rada under the pretext of raising social standards. Out of this stupid situation Yanukovych can not jump because the nerve center “regionals” simply not come up with other chips, which you can switch after the collapse of the “social” issues. And that direct question, Boris Kolesnikov, ruled by the ideology of the election headquarters AVE.

Bewildered People’s Deputy in a conversation with proUA not ruled out the cause of “unready”: “Akhmetov wing” is not trying to merge Yanukovych, but not to escalate the relationship with Tymoshenko. The year 2004 did not want to repeat.

Especially now that in times of crisis, Akhmetov, even approximately, can not spend on Yanukovich as much as five years ago. On the one hand, he himself had been reduced revenues. On the other – Yanukovych no longer wants to take Akhmetov controlling stake.

According to sources “proUA”, Viktor Yanukovych in the beginning of this year finally settled with the donor for the money spent by his staff during the 2004 elections flops. The final amount of calculation, according to various sources, could reach $ 460-500 million

Therefore, Yanukovych announced the collection: “From the faction and the Donets Basin on a thread – Leader of the crown. Minimum fee – a million dollars. In return, promised a place in the future list for elections to the Rada. Up to seven million comes the promise of leadership in state corporation. Ministerial post draws ten million. However, the donor understands the value of election promises: the formation of the future Cabinet will still have dovznosit, now it is about money, giving in the future the right to “recall, you promised.” So are thrown off everything, even businesses that have entered into talks with Tymoshenko.

Meanwhile, the headquarters, more staffs, most of the Prime Minister is on full. The viability of pro-government majority is too dependent on the outcome of elections. In times of “crisis” coalition with one foot on the threshold of the PR were Zhevago, Buriak, Vasadze and Khmelnitsky altogether passed. Therefore, in case of victory businessmen can vote for dismissal “in the name of stability.” Precisely to avoid new early elections, and hence the new charges. One of the “regionals” predicted proUA: «The day after the election we will have 270 votes for her resignation.”

For the sake of victory staffs really tense. There even appeared a well-known political consultant Yuri Levenec. The one that in 1999, along with Alexander Volkov made by President Kuchma, and in 2004 almost did not repeat the success already with Yanukovych.

Levenec occupied a high place in the hierarchy of the official headquarters. He even entrusted with instructing the People’s Deputy to the “freedom of speech. But his name is often too tight association with the group, referred to as “a group of lawyers” ( “proUA” already indicated dissatisfaction with the “security officials” “lawyers”, sometimes developing into netsenzurschinu, and sometimes in criminal cases.)

And discontent manifested in the creation of yet another campaign headquarters. Sources attribute this initiative the same Turchinov (in the main headquarters were not included many of his minions) and Bogdan Gubsky (did not get the staff in general, although the 2007 elections, played an important role in the campaign). On the functions of the staff yet to be known. The sources attributed this invisibility that Tymoshenko has satisfied the actions of the head office. And, then Turchinov can not afford to offer an alternative. Therefore forced to prove its usefulness in harness with their opponents.

In any case, future elections have already identified the main trend: working against the headquarters of the Olympic peace. Winning one, and has played only among the two.

PS After the publication Bogdan Gubsky commented «proUA» situation in the headquarters of Yulia Tymoshenko: “We have no shadow staffs. As a member of the official headquarters, there is no point in creating a shadow headquarters. BYT known fact that we have no shadow schemes, BYT – completely transparent structure. And the work of the central headquarters, we completely transparent. Therefore, information on any shadow, or “black”, or technological staffs do not correspond to reality. In my opinion, such shadow staffs need those political structures, which are famous for their corrupt activities. Whether for stealing money, or to bribe voters.

Yushchenko vetoed a new version of the presidential election law, which was passed on July 24, but parliament overruled the decision on August 21. Commenting on the development, Ihor Popov, the Deputy Head of the Presidential Secretariat predicted that Yushchenko would appeal to the constitutional court against several provisions in the new law. He warned that the legitimacy of the election might be questioned if the court outlawed those provisions (Ukrainska Pravda, August 21).

Yushchenko appealed on September 15. His representative in the constitutional court Maryna Stavniychuk specified that he argued that the new law limits the rights of Ukrainians voting abroad, fails to ensure a transparent election process or offer mechanisms to improve voter lists, and does not provide for control of the process by courts (Ukrainska Pravda, September 15). Popov commented on the same day that if the constitutional court pronounced the provisions rejected by Yushchenko as unconstitutional, then the election could be disrupted. He urged parliament to urgently correct those provisions. If it did so, Popov said, the election would be held “in an organized and normal manner.” He suggested that parliament’s failure to smoothly pass the 2010 state budget also threatened the election, because there would be no money to organize the process (Channel 5, September 15). Parliament may fail to pass the budget by the end of the year, due to a blockade of the session hall organized by the opposition Party of Regions (PRU) (EDM, September 16).

Popov’s statement prompted an angry reaction from Tymoshenko’s key ally, First Deputy Prime Minister Oleksandr Turchynov. He accused Yushchenko of trying to disrupt the election by both blocking the budget in parliament (Turchynov apparently suspects that Yushchenko backs parliament’s blockade by the PRU) and appealing against the new law. “This is his last chance to cling to power,” explained Turchynov. He warned that if the court rejected the new law, all the election schedules and deadlines would be disrupted (Channel 5, September 17). Tymoshenko echoed Turchynov’s views the following day, warning about two possible scenarios to postpone the election, which she claimed were being prepared by Yushchenko’s team. According to the first scenario, the court would dump the new election law, consequently preventing an election. While the second scenario involved, “the economy being brought to collapse” through weakening the national currency and “a state of emergency should be imposed.” Tymoshenko recalled that no election may be held during a state of emergency (Dnipropetrovsk Regional TV, September 18).

The Central Electoral Commission (TsVK), the constitutional court and Yushchenko’s team flatly dismissed the allegations by Turchynov and Tymoshenko. TsVK Deputy Head Andry Mahera said that parliament’s failure to pass next year’s budget would not affect the election process, since there are enough funds provided for the election in the 2009 budget to start the process (Interfax-Ukraine, September 18). Andry Stryzhak, the Chairman of the constitutional court said that even if the court pronounced the entire election law as unconstitutional, the election would be held according to the existing law. Stavniychuk, for her part, dismissed the possibility of imposing a state of emergency. She noted that the president would constitutionally require parliamentary approval, and that the parliament is dominated by the supporters of Tymoshenko and Yanukovych who would not agree to postpone the election (Kommersant-Ukraine, September 21). Yushchenko’s secretariat head Vira Ulyanchenko recalled that Yushchenko had not appealed against the entire law, but only several of its provisions, meaning that no court verdict could possibly disrupt the election (ICTV, September 20).

The PRU, whose leader Viktor Yanukovych is likely to be Tymoshenko’s main rival in the election, reacted calmly. Parliamentary Deputy Speaker Oleksandr Lavrynovych, who is a PRU senior member, suggested that Yushchenko’s appeal would not affect the election. He agreed with Ulyanchenko that Yushchenko appealed only against several provisions in the election law, so the court could not pronounce the entire law as unconstitutional (www.liga.net, September 21). Popov again suggested that parliament should urgently amend the law, in order to meet Yushchenko’s demands. In this case, he said, Yushchenko would recall his appeal from the court (Segodnya, September 21). Yanukovych’s unofficial spokeswoman Hanna Herman said that Yushchenko was not in a position to set conditions as his political influence is waning. “The presidential election will take place in any case,” she predicted (Channel 5, September 21).

In Hermit’s Hut team there are many Professional Astrologers and Sages, some are living in Himalayan Region and some are in Metropolitan cities and contributing in our efforts to eradicate materialistic problems through Vedic Astrological remedies by performing Vedic Yagnas.

This association has a seperate Corporate office in New Delhi and three branches are in Varanasi (Banaras, UP), Rishikesh (UP) & Gauhati (Kamakhaya Dham – The Divine place of Goddess Durga). All type of enquiries are received and processed in New Delhi office and remedies Yagnas are performed mainly in New Delhi apart from the speical nature of Yagna which are performed at Rishikesh and Varanasi also. All predictions are made by our panel astrologer’s team only.

I, Acharya Mithilesh, a Post Graduate Degree holder with vast experience in astrological predictions and remedial measures. My astrological career started since I met the HImalayan Sages during the performance of different Yagnas at several places in the Himalayan region, about 10 years back. I sought the holy blessings of these Gurus as a performer of Astrology and Upayas (Remedies), which I successfully got from them to fulfill my aim. My motto was to spread the vast astrological knowledge of these Gurus to other parts of the world. As these Gurus are confined to their places only and due to their knowledge in Hindi and Sanskrit only, they wanted to spread this divine knowledge for healing the sufferings of the mankind.

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Yushchenko recently signed an agreement for Zurabov to visit Kiev, but the new Russian ambassador still had to deliver his credentials before taking the position. Kommersant daily even wrote about a joke among Ukrainian diplomats who said that Zurabov “would be passed on to the next president.”

Read more

Now it seems that the joke has come true, and Moscow will try to mend ties with Kiev only after Ukrainians elect a new leader. “Dmitry Medvedev, in a videoblog, has reset the relations with Viktor Yushchenko,” Vremya Novostey daily wrote.

“The Russian leadership has made a principal decision to strain relations with Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, who is preparing to run for a second term in the presidential election in January,” the paper said.

“The Kremlin has never expressed its complaints against Yushchenko in so concentrated and tough a manner,” the daily said. “This approach is in the interests of any other presidential hopeful in Ukraine.”

Medvedev no longer considers Yushchenko the president and Moscow calls the Ukrainian policies “openly anti-Russian,” Kommersant daily wrote. “The Georgian scheme” is being used – “no relations with Mr. Yushchenko until the power changes in Kiev,” the paper said.

“Thus, Moscow has not only entered the presidential campaign in Ukraine, as in 2004, but has indicated clearly who should lose in this competition,” Kommersant wrote. However, the paper believes one of the reasons behind Medvedev’s decision could be the “latest actions of the Ukrainian president in the gas sphere, which is extremely sensitive for Moscow.”

Another daily, Vedomosti, believes that “a new gas war” is too minor a reason for such extensive statements. The paper called the argument between Russia and Ukraine “a quarrel of Siamese twins.”

“Russia depends on Ukraine not less than Ukraine on Russia,” the paper said in an editorial.

“What rational result Moscow would like to achieve by its maneuver?” Vedomosti asks. If Russia has entered the Ukrainian presidential election, as in 2004, then “this support will not add votes to traditionally pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovich,” the daily said.

At the same time “Yushchenko’s extraordinarily low rating” may go up, the paper stressed. However, Russia may “be playing some smart game in favor of [Ukrainian Prime Minister] Yulia Tymoshenko, Vedomosti assumed.

“Russia with Ukraine and Russia without Ukraine are two different forces,” the paper stressed. “Quarreling with Ukraine, Russia is losing weight, not gaining it,” the daily added. “Attempts to exert pressure (it does not matter whether in the gas sphere or psychological one) force Ukrainian politicians to insist more on confrontation with Russia.”

At the same time, Business-FM radio quoted the president of the “Polity” Foundation, Vyacheslav Nikonov, as saying that Medvedev “is making a proposal of peace to Viktor Yushchenko.”

Peter Rutland, Professor of Government at Wesleyan University, believes there is a nexus of reasons behind Russia’s step. “President Medvedev’s announcement about delaying the dispatch of the new Russian ambassador to Kiev signals his frustration with recent actions by the Ukrainian government – the two-month delay in the approval of the new Russian ambassador, the expulsion of a Russian diplomat, and bans on some movement of Russian naval equipment in Sevastopol,” Rutland told RT.

“Then there is the July 31 loan agreement brokered by the European Commission, which Medvedev said was ‘absolutely incompatible’ with Russia’s prior arrangements with Naftohaz,” Rutland added.

The Kremlin’s decision “also comes against a broader backdrop of a deliberate use of nationalist rhetoric by President Yushchenko during what will almost certainly be the final six months of his presidency,” Rutland said.

The explanations of the Russian side are clear, Rutland said. “What is not so clear is what Medvedev hopes to gain by the announcement,” he added. “To some extent it will just provide more ammunition for Western critics, who argue that Russia is out to undermine Ukraine’s viability.”

“Yushchenko is politically dead, many leading positions in the Ukrainian government are empty (foreign affairs, defense, finance),” Rutland stressed. “In this context surely it would be more rational for Russia to adopt a hands-off approach. Diplomacy of empty gestures, such as refusing to send an ambassador, will achieve nothing.”

Perhaps the gesture was meant “to bolster Medvedev’s image as an assertive president before the domestic Russian audience,” Rutland said. He added, however, that it was “not a very good basis on which to conduct a nation’s foreign policy.”

Moscow’s decision seems “linked to two things: the departure of the controversial figure of [former ambassador Viktor] Chernomyrdin from Kiev and the Ukrainian presidential election campaign that is just beginning,” David Marples, a distinguished university professor at University of Alberta, said.

However, this does not seem to affect the presidential campaign much, “because Yushchenko is more unpopular in Ukraine than he is in Russia,” Marples told RT.

“It is a counter-productive move though because it only draws attention to the Ukrainian president and his position on Georgia, NATO, etc.,” Marples stressed. “And it gives the impression of Russian interference in the campaign, similar to that of then-President Vladimir Putin in 2004.

As for the efforts of both leaderships “to use history as a political tool,” Marples called them “reprehensible.”

The Ukrainian leader now has several options, analysts say. He could even “withdraw his ambassador from Moscow for a while,” Marples said.

Yushchenko also has an opportunity “to make independence and freedom from Russian intervention (especially in Crimea) as part of his election platform,” Marples added. “It was already a key element of his rhetoric, but now it appears to have more substance, which is why Medvedev’s move is, in my view, a political error.”

Some 44% of Russians polled by the Levada Center at the end of July said their attitude to Ukraine is “good or very good.” In July 2001, 71% of those surveyed thought the same. Now 47% of respondents said their opinions of Ukraine are “mainly bad or very bad.”

Meanwhile, readers of the Russian president’s blog in the internet are discussing Medvedev’s statement about the relations with Ukraine. Komsomolskaya Pravda daily wrote that “most people ask the president not to go too far because the Ukrainian government is not the entire Ukrainian people.”

Dmitry Medvedev’s decision to refrain from sending the Russian ambassador to Kiev has been interpreted by the media and analysts as Moscow’s rupture with the Ukrainian president.

Medvedev cited as the main reason behind his decision as “the openly anti-Russian stand” of the leadership in Kiev. In addition to this, new Russian ambassador Mihail Zurabov had been waiting for Ukrainian approval for some weeks.

Yushchenko recently signed an agreement for Zurabov to visit Kiev, but the new Russian ambassador still had to deliver his credentials before taking the position. Kommersant daily even wrote about a joke among Ukrainian diplomats who said that Zurabov “would be passed on to the next president.”

Read more

Now it seems that the joke has come true, and Moscow will try to mend ties with Kiev only after Ukrainians elect a new leader. “Dmitry Medvedev, in a videoblog, has reset the relations with Viktor Yushchenko,” Vremya Novostey daily wrote.

“The Russian leadership has made a principal decision to strain relations with Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, who is preparing to run for a second term in the presidential election in January,” the paper said.

“The Kremlin has never expressed its complaints against Yushchenko in so concentrated and tough a manner,” the daily said. “This approach is in the interests of any other presidential hopeful in Ukraine.”

Medvedev no longer considers Yushchenko the president and Moscow calls the Ukrainian policies “openly anti-Russian,” Kommersant daily wrote. “The Georgian scheme” is being used – “no relations with Mr. Yushchenko until the power changes in Kiev,” the paper said.

“Thus, Moscow has not only entered the presidential campaign in Ukraine, as in 2004, but has indicated clearly who should lose in this competition,” Kommersant wrote. However, the paper believes one of the reasons behind Medvedev’s decision could be the “latest actions of the Ukrainian president in the gas sphere, which is extremely sensitive for Moscow.”

Another daily, Vedomosti, believes that “a new gas war” is too minor a reason for such extensive statements. The paper called the argument between Russia and Ukraine “a quarrel of Siamese twins.”

“Russia depends on Ukraine not less than Ukraine on Russia,” the paper said in an editorial.

“What rational result Moscow would like to achieve by its maneuver?” Vedomosti asks. If Russia has entered the Ukrainian presidential election, as in 2004, then “this support will not add votes to traditionally pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovich,” the daily said.

At the same time “Yushchenko’s extraordinarily low rating” may go up, the paper stressed. However, Russia may “be playing some smart game in favor of [Ukrainian Prime Minister] Yulia Tymoshenko, Vedomosti assumed.

“Russia with Ukraine and Russia without Ukraine are two different forces,” the paper stressed. “Quarreling with Ukraine, Russia is losing weight, not gaining it,” the daily added. “Attempts to exert pressure (it does not matter whether in the gas sphere or psychological one) force Ukrainian politicians to insist more on confrontation with Russia.”

At the same time, Business-FM radio quoted the president of the “Polity” Foundation, Vyacheslav Nikonov, as saying that Medvedev “is making a proposal of peace to Viktor Yushchenko.”

Peter Rutland, Professor of Government at Wesleyan University, believes there is a nexus of reasons behind Russia’s step. “President Medvedev’s announcement about delaying the dispatch of the new Russian ambassador to Kiev signals his frustration with recent actions by the Ukrainian government – the two-month delay in the approval of the new Russian ambassador, the expulsion of a Russian diplomat, and bans on some movement of Russian naval equipment in Sevastopol,” Rutland told RT.

“Then there is the July 31 loan agreement brokered by the European Commission, which Medvedev said was ‘absolutely incompatible’ with Russia’s prior arrangements with Naftohaz,” Rutland added.

The Kremlin’s decision “also comes against a broader backdrop of a deliberate use of nationalist rhetoric by President Yushchenko during what will almost certainly be the final six months of his presidency,” Rutland said.

The explanations of the Russian side are clear, Rutland said. “What is not so clear is what Medvedev hopes to gain by the announcement,” he added. “To some extent it will just provide more ammunition for Western critics, who argue that Russia is out to undermine Ukraine’s viability.”

“Yushchenko is politically dead, many leading positions in the Ukrainian government are empty (foreign affairs, defense, finance),” Rutland stressed. “In this context surely it would be more rational for Russia to adopt a hands-off approach. Diplomacy of empty gestures, such as refusing to send an ambassador, will achieve nothing.”

Perhaps the gesture was meant “to bolster Medvedev’s image as an assertive president before the domestic Russian audience,” Rutland said. He added, however, that it was “not a very good basis on which to conduct a nation’s foreign policy.”

Moscow’s decision seems “linked to two things: the departure of the controversial figure of [former ambassador Viktor] Chernomyrdin from Kiev and the Ukrainian presidential election campaign that is just beginning,” David Marples, a distinguished university professor at University of Alberta, said.

However, this does not seem to affect the presidential campaign much, “because Yushchenko is more unpopular in Ukraine than he is in Russia,” Marples told RT.

“It is a counter-productive move though because it only draws attention to the Ukrainian president and his position on Georgia, NATO, etc.,” Marples stressed. “And it gives the impression of Russian interference in the campaign, similar to that of then-President Vladimir Putin in 2004.

As for the efforts of both leaderships “to use history as a political tool,” Marples called them “reprehensible.”

The Ukrainian leader now has several options, analysts say. He could even “withdraw his ambassador from Moscow for a while,” Marples said.

Yushchenko also has an opportunity “to make independence and freedom from Russian intervention (especially in Crimea) as part of his election platform,” Marples added. “It was already a key element of his rhetoric, but now it appears to have more substance, which is why Medvedev’s move is, in my view, a political error.”

Some 44% of Russians polled by the Levada Center at the end of July said their attitude to Ukraine is “good or very good.” In July 2001, 71% of those surveyed thought the same. Now 47% of respondents said their opinions of Ukraine are “mainly bad or very bad.”

Meanwhile, readers of the Russian president’s blog in the internet are discussing Medvedev’s statement about the relations with Ukraine. Komsomolskaya Pravda daily wrote that “most people ask the president not to go too far because the Ukrainian government is not the entire Ukrainian people.”

Ukraine, in contrast, has neither a consolidated political system nor significant financial reserves. During the first quarter of 2009, the Ukrainian economy seems to have contracted between 20-23 percent, and its industrial production might have fallen as much as 30 percent. Given the limited capacities of the Ukrainian government to deal with the social aftermath of these developments, the effects of the crisis on Ukrainian domestic politics and foreign relations are unpredictable. To be sure, Ukrainians have shown considerable maturity in earlier periods of political crisis, such as during the country’s last contested presidential elections. It is often ignored, however, that 2004 was not only the moment of the Orange Revolution, but also a year of steep economic growth of almost 10 percent. In contrast, Ukraine’s economy today is experiencing a depression that rivals the 1992-1994 plunge in industrial production.

As if this were not challenging enough, Ukraine is facing an increasingly assertive Russia on which it is economically dependent. Until recently, Ukraine’s energy reliance on its Eastern neighbour was partly neutralized by Russia’s heavy dependence on the Ukrainian gas pipeline system which delivers Russian gas to the European Union (EU) and on the Kremlin’s stated interest in preserving the Sevastopol naval base for Russia’s Black Sea fleet. Neither of these two balancing mechanisms is fully functional today. Out of parochial interests, the EU has been pressuring Ukraine to “internationalize” energy transportation. While understandable from a Central and West European view, “internationalization” is weakening Ukrainian control of perhaps the most important instrument of securing Ukrainian independence from Russia. Out of his familiar political myopia, President Viktor Yushchenko has prematurely declared that Ukraine, in any case, intends to close Sevastopol for the Russian fleet when the current contract for the lease of the Crimean port expires in 2017. Whereas earlier, the Russian and Ukrainian governments had something to negotiate about, Kiev’s diplomatic leverage has diminished today. The Kremlin, aware of Ukraine’s new weakness on a daily basis, threatens via mass media to cut gas deliveries if Ukraine does not pay in time for them.

Moreover, in 2008, the Moscow leadership demonstrated in Georgia – not the least to Kiev – that it is prepared to use military force to defend vital interests in her “near abroad.” Many Russian politicians have let it be known, in public, that the Crimea’s majority Russian ethnic makeup places the peninsula within Moscow’s natural sphere of influence. Some even see Crimea as a part of Russia’s historic territory.

Worse, Ukraine’s political system prescribes new presidential elections in January 2010, when a new standoff between Ukraine and Russia concerning gas deliveries and payments is likely to occur. In fact, given the Ukrainian state’s current financial difficulties, Russia may regard it politically opportune as well as domestically and internationally justifiable to cut gas deliveries to Ukraine already before January 2010. Polling data shows that anti-Ukrainian sentiment is growing in Russia’s population as a result of the daily xenophobic brainwashing by the Kremlin-directed propaganda machine. As a hard line against Kiev becomes increasingly popular among ordinary Russians, the Moscow leadership may conclude that cutting gas deliveries to Ukraine would kill two birds with one stone: it would divert attention from its own omissions in reforming Russia’s post-Soviet state and economy, and it would cause serious trouble for Kiev’s Orange government, in domestic affairs and/or foreign relations.

In the case of new gas delivery cuts, the government of Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko will face an awkward choice. If it chooses to stomach the cuts, it will alienate the Ukrainian population when further industrial plants come to a standstill and Ukrainians’ flats become cold. If it chooses to siphon gas from the Ukrainian pipelines that deliver gas from Russia to the European Union, Ukraine’s Orange cabinet will alienate its EU partners and violate international law.

“Not only is the current Ukrainian dual power system deficient, but semi-presidential systems, at least in transition countries, are generally a bad choice”

As Ukraine’s economic, social and political crisis sharpens, more and more Ukrainians may question the wisdom of conducting a costly presidential election when the Ukrainian state is almost bankrupt – if not on the brink of collapse. After all, Ukraine does have a legitimate legislature as well as a more or less operational government. In the increasingly difficult situation that Ukraine awaits during the coming months, the election of a second ruler appears as luxury. Moreover, by participation in these elections, Ukrainians would legitimize the semi-presidential system that is obviously unsuitable for Ukraine – as has been manifestly demonstrated by the agonizing intra-executive conflicts, during the last years.

Not only is the current Ukrainian dual power system deficient, but semi-presidential systems, at least in transition countries, are generally a bad choice, if one believes the results of comparative research into this political system. For instance, in 2008, the Irish government professor Robert Elgie and American political researcher Sophia Moestrup published the collected volume Semi-Presidentialism in Central and Eastern Europe. This book contains research papers by leading specialists on post-Soviet institutional design and performance in Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. The study confirms previous scholarly work that has indicated concerns about the political system that Ukraine inherited when it acquired independence in 1991. Elgie’s and Moestrup’s paper collection shows once more that the impact of semi-presidentialism on the transition to and consolidation of, democracy is negative or at least unhelpful. In the case of Central and Eastern Europe, this concerns both highly presidentialized semi-presidentialism, like Ukraine until 2005, and balanced presidential-prime ministerial semi-presidentialism, like Ukraine has had since 2006. The scholars conclude that, “if democracy is fragile, then semi-presidentialism of any form is probably best avoided.”

With presidential elections scheduled for January 17, 2010, Ukraine is about to reproduce a political system that will be detrimental to its interests, especially considering the possibly grave domestic repercussions of the world financial crisis and Moscow’s continuously growing imperial appetite. In the unlikely best-case scenario that the latter issues do not become salient, Ukraine will still be losing if it decides to go ahead with the 2010 presidential elections.

“Hard times are awaiting Europe’s youngest and largest democracy, and one can only hope that the encouraging sanity and moderation that Kiev’s elites have shown before will also prevail in the current situation.”

Recent rumours in Kiev are indicating that at least a part of the Ukrainian political elite seems to be interested in serious institutional reform. From late May to early June 2009, secret negotiations were conducted between Tymoshenko’s Bloc and Viktor Yanukovych’s opposition Party of Regions about the formation of a coalition to change the constitution, create a parliamentary republic, and cancel next year’s presidential elections. The idea was to have Ukraine’s parliament, instead of the people, elect the President. This would preserve the current dual executive and power-sharing arrangement while depriving the President of a direct popular mandate. Although Ukraine would still be ruled by both a President and Prime-Minister, the two leaders would be dependent on parliament and on each other; they would be less inclined to enter into the agonizing conflicts prevalent throughout the last few years. While these changes would not have solved Ukraine’s two major headaches – payment for gas deliveries and Kremlin hostility – they would have calmed down political bickering in Kiev and stabilized the Ukrainian government. The modification was obviously designed to provide Yanukovich with an important office in the executive. It would also have avoided the dirty electoral campaigning that has already started and the costly two-round voting process scheduled for early 2010. However, Yanukovich decided to leave the negotiation table. As of today, the presidential elections will thus continue as prescribed under the current Constitution.

Hard times are awaiting Europe’s youngest and largest democracy, and one can only hope that the encouraging sanity and moderation that Kiev’s elites have shown before will also prevail in the current situation. Ideally, Yanukovich and Tymoshenko will return to the negotiation table and reconsider the issue of the upcoming elections. Preserving the current semi-presidential system serves neither the short-term nor the long-term interests of Ukraine. Switching to a parliamentary republic would free Kiev’s political elite to focus its attention on numerous other pressing problems. In the coming months, Kiev’s political elite will need to concentrate on far more important issues than electoral campaigning.

One historical figure that has come to be synonymous with prophecies is Nostradamus, whose name happens to be one of the most frequently searched on the Internet. His “Centuries” are said to have prophesied the burning and devastation of Moscow in 1571, Napoleon’s defeat in 1812, the victory of communism in Russia and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union.

Recently, Russia pulled off a hat trick: hockey, football and Eurovision. The country was ecstatic and there was jubilation in the air. The press was obsessed about it, and still are. Among all the chaos I read the following comment on the Internet: When the Northern Empire wins on Ice and Grass and its Clown sings his song, Red Clouds will cover the Sky and the Apocalypse will come. This grim prophecy was said to have been one of the Bulgarian prophetess Vanga’s predictions, and that made me think about Russia’s future. Sear­ching for some evidence to substantiate the claim, I found out the passage was a harmless joke. Still, there are lots of prophecies about Russia that make people sit up and pay attention.

Vanga was born at the turn of the 20th century and died 12 years ago at the age of 84. Her gift of prophesy made her popular, and soon politicians visited her to have their fortunes told.

Among her most shocking predictions is what she had predicted in 1980: In August of 1999 or 2000, Kursk will be covered with water and the whole world will be weeping over it. Twenty years later, the nuclear submarine “Kursk” perished in an accident.

In January 1988 she said: We are witnessing events of paramount significance. Two big leaders shake hands. But we have to wait for a long time before the Eighth one will come forth and sign a final peace agreement on Earth. The first part of the prediction made reference to Gorbachev and Reagan, and the second to the fact that Russia joined the Group of Seven, now the G-8.

In the same way, she predicted some other events of world history. In 1989: The American brethren will fall after being attacked by the steel bird. The wolves will howl in the bush, and innocent blood will flow. It happened as predicted: The “Twin” towers of the World Trade Center in New York collapsed apparently because two commercial planes – “steel birds” – were flown into them. She predicted lots of things – the Chernobyl disaster, Boris Yeltsin’s election win and so on. It is even said that Adolf Hitler left a visit with her looking very upset.

One of the popular predictions about Russia is that when the permafrost thaws and the floods come, nothing will survive on Earth but Russia. The climate will change and Russia will occupy the best inhabitable zone. Plus, Russia is predicted to herald in world peace and flourish in the face of good fortune.

Vanga also once said: “Everything melts away like ice yet the glory of Vladimir, the glory of Russia are the only things that will remain. Russia will not only survive, it will dominate the world.”

Russia is on a roll with assorted victories. Whether we can believe that Russia will initiate world peace, however, remains to be seen.

Bucking their nominal leader, Yushchenko’s parliamentary faction Our Ukraine – People’s Self-Defense signed a formal coalition agreement with Tymoshenko’s and Rada Speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn’s factions on Dec. 16. After several days of intrigues, 37 out of 72 Our Ukraine members joined the coalition, forming a coalition of 213 deputies – still short of the 226 majority.

The signing of a new coalition deal caused a bitter split in the faction and resignation of its leader, Vyacheslav Kyrylenko, and deputy head Roman Zvarych, who remain loyal to the president. “I think that the faction’s decision [to join the coalition] is moronic, and I cannot be a leader of a moronic faction,” said Zvarych.

Mykola Martynenko and Borys Tarasyuk are among the candidates vying to lead the faction, while the split and alienation of Yushchenko from his own party will continue. “The president’s influence on the faction will continue to decrease,” said Taras Stetskiv, an Our Ukraine – People’s Self Defense deputy who also supported the coalition of three. “Yushchenko ignored his chance to allow the whole OU-PSD faction to join the coalition and lost his only chance for becoming its leader.” Stetskiv predicted that eventually up to 60 people will sign the coalition agreement.

While the pro-presidential camp continued to fight, other ex-presidential allies, ex-Rada speaker Arseniy Yatsenyuk and ex-Defense Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko announced that each of them is starting their own political movements. Yatsenyuk’s is named Front of Changes while Hrytsenko’s movement is called Civil Position. Both may become political parties

Ukrainian tabloids have published quite a number of articles on Andrei’s adventures in Dubai, when he bought Chanel bags worth $500,000 for his girlfriend.

He also became known for ordering a bottle of champagne with oysters for 2,000 euros ($2,768) at Kiev’s most luxurious nightclub.

Andrei Yushchenko was originally spotted with a new girlfriend Elizaveta (Liza for short) in the middle of the summer of 2008.

Everyone thought that it was just another girlfriend for the adventurous young man. It became known afterwards, though, that Andrei organized a ‘meet the parents’ party at his father’s home in Kiev.

President Yushchenko reportedly had nothing against their wedding.

Liza is only 21 years old, but she owns a luxury apartment in one of the most prestigious neighborhoods in Kiev.

She frequently attends fashionable parties in Monte Carlo and Courchevel and buys clothes from latest collections of world’s most renowned designers.

She appeared on front pages in a company of wealthy businessman Roman Gurevich. However, when Yushchenko’s son paid his attention to her, the woman decided not to miss such a chance.

Andrei Yushchenko thus had to accomplish a difficult goal to outstrip businessman Gurevich behind in terms of his generosity.

Andrei can be a very good match at this point: he lives in a 600 square-meter penthouse apartment. His fellow-students say that he owns a platinum Vertu cell phone worth 43,500 euros ($60,000).

He usually leaves $500 tips at restaurants and spends there not less than two or three thousand euros. He is the only owner of BMW M6 in Kiev ($130,000).

President Viktor Yushchenko uses the symbols of the orange revolution to let his son lead his idle life.

The orange revolution brand (orange scarves, mittens, hats, flags, etc) is evaluated at $100 million, experts calculated.

The Ukrainian Souvenir company sells orange revolution photo albums, watches, cigarette lighters and mugs, while Andrei Yushchenko simply has to go to the bank to get some cash.

Andrei’s previous girlfriend, Anna Pavlovich, enjoyed the orange fruit too. The couple booked a $2,500-a-night hotel room during their holiday in Turkey.

In the meantime, Andrei showers his new girlfriend with luxury. He ordered to pack everything that Liza would choose at a Chanel boutique and spent $500,000 to please the girl.

Having had experience in dealing with Mr Hallman in the past we thought it was appropriate to once again undertake some due diligence checks. As we understand Mr Hallman has not visited the Kalinkova Internat Orphanage where the photos were taken. The information that Mr Halman refers to was published on the Internet by David Sudermann. As is often the case Mr Hallman tends to exaggerate and take matters out of context and more often then not plagiarise the works of others to give the impression that he is connected or involved. (A typical trait of con artists and charlatans)

A journalist last year contacted the genuine welfare worker and original author of the article that was published on the Kalinovka Orphanage. He specifically asked if David Sudermann could comment on Mr Hallam’s (With whom he has not met) allegations of “Death Camps for Children”.

Below is an extract of his reply..

1. It is clear from your quote that you read the recently posted report on the Kalinovka internat on the http://www.deti.zp.ua/ website. I can speak with some authority on the Kalinovka home, which I first visited in 1999. It is true that the children there have a sufficient quantity of food. But there are several nutrition problems: some severely disabled children cannot swallow or digest properly the food they are given. They need a special diet; but that would cost more, and there is no nutritionist at Kalinovka to work out individual diets. Second, because of under staffing, the children who need to be fed by hand, must wolf down their food. Third, Kalinovka has an attached farm and gardens which produce much of the food consumed at the internat. I have been told, though I have not seen it with my own eyes, that children may receive a diet of squash for long periods of time. Since the old director retired in 2007, I am not certain this is still the case.

2. I categorically reject labeling Ukrainian Orphanages “Death Camps.” This notion apparently comes from an article written by Mr. Terry Hallman, “Ukrainian Death Camps for Children” (http://eng.maidanua.org/node/581 ). First, the use of a term which we use to describe Dachau and Auschwitz is not appropriate for Ukrainian orphanages. In the Social Protection internats for disabled persons (both children and adults), and in Ukrainian mental asylums, there is plenty of neglect, under staffing, lack of resources, lack of adequate medical care, need for proper therapies, proper diet, and so on, but there is no policy of deliberate genocide or murder of the disabled as witnessed in the camps of Nazi Germany.

3. That said, there is a pressing social justice issue surrounding internats. Cognitively and physically disabled persons, not to mention “normal orphans,” are still felt by many to be burdens on society. Their lives appear to have less value and therefore they receive less of the state’s resources. The social policy of making such persons wards of the state and institutionalizing them goes back to the very beginnings of Bolshevik social policy in the 1920s. The structure of the internat system along with the dehumanizing attitudes were deeply rooted in communist society and have carried over into the post-soviet era.

4. In order accurately to describe conditions in the Social Protection internats, one would need to go to each one separately and spend time there. It is hard to believe second-hand reports where the author does not document his assertions or did not visit there. My experience with Kalinovka has been that many caretakers there do not regard the children as salvageable and therefore offer them only “maintenance care.” Most staff lack training in up-to-date methods of working with cerebral palsy and Down Syndrome. In addition, their pay is poor, something less than US200/month. The caretakers seem eager for better training and exposure to new methods. Jim Shetler can give you his impression of the orphanages for “normal” children. I think he will say that there are good-hearted and caring directors and staff in many such internats.

5. The old internat system is not just for children, and I am surprised that those North Americans who are so focused on children do not see the whole landscape. There are also many such places for disabled or mentally ill adults. Not far from Kalinovka in the village of Orlovo, there is a large facility for disabled men. The head nurse who guided the tour I took acknowledged that many changes were needed. She practically begged for outside help.

6. The internat system is run top down by a deeply entrenched bureaucracy. Happy Child and Albert Pavlov have been challenging the system from the bottom up and top down simultaneously. It could be risky. Nonetheless, I am hopeful that their efforts at Kalinovka will exert pressure for change and also change the cultural attitudes upon which the old system is based. Attacking officials of the Social Protection, Health, and Education Ministries is probably not the best strategy. My sense is that once the bureaucrats see that it is in their own best interest to reform care of the disabled, they will get on board pretty fast. For example, if Kalinovka could become a model facility for treating neurologically disabled children, that would make Pankratov, Social Protection Head in Zaporozhye, look very good.

7. I want to return to the Death Camp label to conclude. You may be familiar with the Eugenics Movement at the turn of the century until the 1930s, 40s, even 50s. Eugenics has its origins in the Great Britain and the U.S. but spread to Europe, Nazi Germany, and undoubtedly also influenced Soviet social planners. I have not researched the topic of Soviet social policy, but I strongly suspect that dehumanizing of the disabled in communist countries may have a common eugenics link with U.S. and Germany. This casts a bit of a different light on how to understand the internat phenomenon. Just as important, though, the lack of accountability and transparency in the social agencies allowed for abuses and neglect.

I hope some of this proves helpful to you.

David Sudermann
Northfield, Minnesota

If you are reading this article and wish to make a donation we would advise that you contact David Sudermann directly and not Mr Hallman or his colleague Jeff Mowatt. Contact details are available on http://deti.zp.ua/eng/help.php web site.

On the other hand, we even have little old ladies, those who have been alive long enough to remember the brutality of the Stalin era, sagely opining on how “Ukrainians are being self-important and disrespectful” just because they wish to remember their dead, or how, honestly, Ukrainian lives don’t really matter in all this at all, considering that if the peasants had only laid down for daddy Stalin, they wouldn’t have “deserved” such punishment (I’m not kidding or exaggerating right now – the whitewashing of the Stalin era continues to this day).

I’m not going to say that the truth is in the middle. There is no truth. The only truth are millions of dead bodies, stacked on high from Ukraine, to Kuban, to Kazakhstan.

An authoritarian Russian government cannot simply look back at the Stalin period in particular and declare it to be terrible. That would go against the very nature of authoritarianism. This is why we have the present charade going on in regards to the Holodomor – it’s all “how DARE those uppity Ukrainians! What about the people starving along the Volga?” What about them, indeed? Those people were victims as well. Are Russians encouraged to remember them? Is the world?

Was the Holodomor a genocide? It was, if you expand the definition of what genocide means. Although Ukraine was targeted specifically due to Stalin’s desire to crush and destroy the merest thought of independence, it was a specific class – the peasants – who bore the brunt of the famine.

The peasants resisted unfair collectivization and paid for it dearly, with their lives and the lives of their children.

However, the ethnic element of Holodomor must also include tales of how many of the perpetrators – the ones who literally took the food out of the mouths of Ukrainian peasants – were ethnic Ukrainians sitting pretty in the lap of the regime. It seems perfectly logical. You don’t put a population as large as the Ukrainian population on its knees without many collaborators. So for all of the cries of “it was the Russians” (not stated officially but heard often nonetheless), I have to say that there was nothing so simple and clear-cut about the Stalin years. I mean, Stalin himself was Georgian. You don’t hear cries of “it was the Georgians” – not until it suddenly becomes politically expedient, anyway.

The Russian government, in its snide dismissals of the Holodomor legacy, cannot deny the very simple fact that it does not want to remember the Russians who died in the famines as well. Their bodies are only trotted out as a human flesh for the rhetorical cannons aimed against Ukraine.

Despite my dislike of Yuschenko – often so kindly described in the Western press as a “pro-Western” politician, when he is in fact a pro-Yuschenko politician – I have to admit that for all of his bluster, he has stopped short of the kinds of excesses that Russian public personae have committed when speaking about Ukraine. When Medvedev speaks of a “so-called Holodomor,” you can feel the hatred, that which journalist Dmitriy Gordon (himself a controversial figure) has described as “Russian superpower chauvinism,” rising up like bile.

I hate Russian superpower chauvinism, for social and personal reasons, not the least of which have to do with having a Russian mother and a father who declares himself Ukrainian (his own father’s Russian ethnicity having no importance to him in the matter).

The saddest thing in all of this – besides the millions of emaciated dead bodies, besides children being chased by raving cannibals – is the fact that Russia and Ukraine are still neighbours, they still have a shared history, they still have a future that’s going to see us closely entwined. And that future looks ugly, ugly enough so that children like me are being forced to choose sides, as if being forced to choose between two squabbling, divorced parents, whom they will never stop loving, no matter what.